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SMALL BUSINESS PERFORMANCE IN THE REGULATED ECONOMY 
By Kenneth W. Chilton and Murray L. Weidenbaum 
SUMMARY 
In spite of the widespread concern about the various burdens im-
posed by government regulation in America today, there seems to be a 
naive belief on the part of some government policymakers and much of 
the public that the regulatory system is neutral with respect to the 
size of the business firm. In reality, a great deal of government 
regulation has disproportionately adverse effects on smaller businesses. 
One of the most serious threats to the continued existence of the 
small firm is the requirement for major capital expenditures to meet 
environmental or workplace safety standards. Less frequent, but no less 
serious, are regulations that reduce the market for a firm•s product, 
such as a ban on a product, or a perfonmance standard that precludes the 
use of the product for its nonmal market application. 
Typically, the small firm must rely on relatively short-tenm debt 
in order to finance its operations, and this reliance tends to make \ha f1nm 
a poor candidate for increased debt to meet regulatory requirements. 
For instance, if a large company has access to bond markets and borrows 
one million dollars to meet regulatory capital expendi.tures at a 10 per-
cent rate, the annual amortization of principal plus interest on a 20-
year bond would amount to approximately $96,500 a year. The same amount 
Kenneth W. Chilton and Murray L. Weidenbaum are Acting Director and 
Director, respectively, of the Center for the Study of American Business 
at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. 
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of money borrowed by a small firm on a ten year term loan basis at a 15 
percent rate would require principal and interest payments of $193,000 
a year -- double that of the firm with access to bond markets. Further-
more, the small firm does not have the same ability to pass along those 
increased costs to the consumer. The large firm with large production 
quantities and less than proportional regulatory costs can pass along 
its increased costs with a smaller increase in unit pricing. In other 
words, capital expenditures mandated by government regulation produce 
artificial 11 economies of scale.'' 
It is also important to know which industry sectors are having the 
most difficulties with federal regulation and how serious these problems 
are. On the basis of the research in this report, it is clear that the 
manufacturing sector is particularly hard hit by the capital requirements 
of federal regulation. 
In a survey of chemical specialties manufacturers conducted by the 
Center for the Study of American Business (89 respondents from a surveyed 
population of 225 firms), the increased operating expenses and capital 
expenditures required by the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration were cited as being parti-
cularly troublesome. Fifteen percent of those firms having difficulty 
with EPA regulations (13 respondents) felt that the agency's regulations 
could cause the firm to close for an unspecified period. In addition, 
nearly 12 percent of these small chemical specialty manufacturers (10 
respondents) felt that EPA regulations could cause a change in ownership 
of their firm. 
A similar survey of the forging industry (a sample of 58 small firms 
in the industry) revealed that OSHA and EPA requirements could also cause 
2 
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these firms to close for some period of time. Twenty-two percent of the 
forging firms felt that OSHA could cause such a closing and 17 percent 
felt that the EPA could have a similar effect. Similarly, a study done by 
Charles River Associates in 1977 for the Lead Industries Association in-
dicated that OSHA air/lead regulations could force the closing of about 
113 single-plant battery firms in this industry, made up of a total of 
only 143 firms. 
In other instances, federal standards may have severe impact on the 
marketability of individual products. One example of this is the effects 
of energy conservation standards set by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and by the Fanmers Home Administration. In rural states 
such as Wisconsin, the FHA rule could force 80 percent of the concrete 
block plants to close, according to a spokesman for the Wisconsin Concrete 
and Products Association. 
Product bans also have a selective but devastating impact on small 
finms. This is particularly true because of the narrow product lines typic-
ally offered by a small firm. One cogent example of this impact was the ban 
of the chemical Tris by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. The small, 
family owned, independent cloth cutters and sewers were ultimately forced 
to pay for the recall of all Tris-treated sleepwear products -- a very 
heavy burden for these small firms. Furthermore, some forms of regulation, 
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of the trucking 
industry, clearly present barriers to entry by small firms. This protec-
tion of the approved carriers, of course, results in increased transpor-
tation costs to the firms using those approved carriers and ultimately to 
~ the consumer. 
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In an overriding sense, the adverse impact of the government's large 
paperwork burden is a qualitative matter. The very notion of paperwork 
is anathema to many small business people. The qualities of drive and 
independence that motivate a person to strike out as an entrepreneur can be 
hostile character traits when it comes to filling out bureaucratic re-
ports. It is impossible to measure the disincentive to this independent 
spirit provided by federal regulation. 
A variety of regulatory reforms in this area has been suggested, in-
eluding: exemption from minor paperwork requirements, two-tiered regulations 
for small and large firms, small business impact statements, and even total 
exemption of small firms from regulation. The simplest reform measure 
would be for the regulato·ry agencies to weigh carefully the effects of 
their activities on business in general and small business in particular, 
prior to final rule setting. This procedure would require a change in 
outlook on the part of many regulators from their current attitude that 
small business is an unfortunate but necessary casualty of their mission 
to serve "the public interest." 
It is clear that the variety of regulation calls for a variety of 
reforms. In some instances, dissemination of information rather than 
standards is needed, as in product safety. In other areas, reorientation of 
the regulatory agencies toward goals rather than requirements is what is 
required, as in the case of workplace safety. Virtually all regulatory 
programs would benefit from a more reasonable approach of weighing their 
I 
costs and benefits and setting priorities among regulatory programs so as to 
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maximize the benefits derived. Some programs need to be specifically 
reviewed and revised by Congress to remove their impossible zero-risk 
requirements on American busines·s. Refonn of federal regulation is 
urgently needed to ensure the vitality of the small business sector of 
the American economy, as well as to assure other important national 
objectives. 
INTRODUCTION* 
This study seeks to document the many and various effects of federal 
regulation on small firms operating in a wide range of industries. The 
report contains six sections. The first section traces the logic for 
selecting a portion of American industry for study based upon a philosophy 
of focusing on the major impacts of federal regulation on small firms. 
Succeeding sections (two through five) examine in detail how federal 
regulation may: (a) affect the very survival of the small firm, (b) 
constitute barriers to entry and innovation, (c) slow firm growth, and 
(d) absorb entrepreneurial energies in paperwork and its unanticipated 
11 Side effects ... The sixth and final section is devoted to conclusions 
and recommendations. 
FOCUSING ON THE MAJOR REGULATORY IMPACTS 
Small firms represent a major portion of the number of finns in 
every industrial category, though obviously they do not account for a 
proportionate share of employment or sales in many of these categories. 
*Note. This paper draws upon earlier research done in cooperation with 
Syracuse University as a part of a compendium of regional papers on small 
business for the Small Business Administration. 
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In the retail, wholesale, and construction sectors, small firms do account 
not only for a large percentage of the number of establishments but also 
for significant portions of the sales. Firms with fewer than 100 em-
ployees accounted for 59%, 76%, and 66% of retail, wholesale and con-
struction sales, respectively, in the United States in 1972~ 1 
Industries Affected by Regulation 
Before much can be said about the effects of regulation on small 
firms, two basic questions need answering: (1) 11 ln which industry 
sectors is federal regulation perceived by small business to be causing 
the most problems? .. and (2) "Which agencies seem to be causing these 
sectors the most difficulty?" The most comprehensive data available 
to answer such questions come from an unpublished survey of 28,000 
small firms conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) in February 1978. Table 1 shows the h.igh proportion of respondents 
that considered regulation to be a small business problem. 
TABLE 1 
Small Businesses Considering Regulation 
To Be .A Problem, By Industry ·sector (% of respondents) 
Transportation 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Wholesale Trade 
87.6% 
84.8% 
83.6% 
75.0% 
74.9% 
Professions 
Finance 
Retail Trade 
Services 
73.2% 
71.6% 
68.9% 
64.9% 
SOURCE: National Federation of Independent Business 
Unfortunately, the NFIB survey included the Internal Revenue Service 
as a .. regulatory agency... Since the IRS regulatory activity is ancillary 
to its basic function of revenue collection, it would be preferable to 
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exclude the problems caused by IRS activities from the survey data. 
However, it is impossible to determine from the NFIB aata just what 
portion of the respondents considered the IRS to be the Qn!l agency 
causing small business problems. But some appreciation of the effect 
of including the IRS as a regulatory agency can be gained by looking at 
Table 2, which lists the firms finding a particular agency to have es-
pecially difficult regulations as a percent of those firms who said some 
agencies have more difficult regulations than others. 
TABLE 2 
Agencies Liste~ As ~ Three Most Difficult 
For SmaJl Business By Sector and Agency* 
-.DEPARTr£NT' OR AGENCY 
WAGE/ 
OSHA EPA IRS HOUR HEW DOT HUD ICC 
Retai 1 Trade 51% 28% 63% 37% 
Wholesale Trade 69% 37% 64% 27% 
Manufacturing 29% 50% 25% 
Construction 00% 34% 59% 34% 
Services 48% 30% 69% 25% 
Finance 95% 35% 59% 23% 
Transportation 47% 69% 61% 
Professions 32% 28% 93% 35% 
Agriculture 71% 84% 47% 
USDA OTHER 
59% 
39% 
*Finns responding that agency 11 X11 has more difficult regulations than 
others as a percent of respondents who feel that some agencies have 
more difficult regulations than others. 
SOURCE: National Federation of Independent Business 
It seems reasonable to deduce from Table 2 that a major portion of 
the dissati~faction of small business people in the professions, services, 
and wholesale and retail trade is due to IRS operations. Furthermore, 
the retail, wholesale, service and finance· sectors appear to react strongly 
to the reporting burrlens of OSHA. Therefore, it seems profitahle to concen-
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trate on the other sectors -- manufacturing, construction and transportation 
since these sectors appear to have difficulties with federal regulation 
beyond paperwork and reporting burdens. In addition, the chemicals and 
apparel industries will be examined within the manufacturing sector. 
SMALL FIRM SURVIVAL 
One of the most serious consequences of federal regulation of 
business is the threat to the continued existence of the small firm. 
In the manufacturing and construction industries, the most frequent 
source of this threat is the requirement for major capital expenditures 
to meet environmental or workplace safety standards. Less frequent 
but no less serious are regulations that reduce the market for a 
firm's product, such as an agency ban of a product or a performance 
standard that precludes the use of the product for its normal market 
application. 
Debt Structure and Market Power 
To understand fully the problems that a non-market demand for 
major capital expenditures can cause a small firm, we need to examine 
the typical debt structure of a small manufacturing concern. Table 3 
shows the debt to equity ratios for manufacturing concerns by asset 
size. It is clear that small firms are carrying a greater debt load 
than the larger businesses. 2 
Furthermore, their higher debt/equity ratios and the particular 
reliance of small firms on relatively short term debt tend to make them 
poor candidates for increased debt incurred to meet regulatory requirements, 
The difference in annual borrowing costs for a large firm that has 
access to bond markets and/or equity markets versus a small firm which 
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relies on short term debt can be dramatic. take a hypothetical 
example of a $1 million loan for capital expenditures. The payments 
for principal and interest for a 10%, 20-year bond would be approxi-
mately $96,500 a year. On the other hand, a ten year bank loan at 
15% interest would require payments of $193,000 a year -- double 
that of the hypothetical bond issue payments. 3 
TABLE 3 
Corporate Debt/Equity Ratios of Manufacturing Concerns 
By Asset Class--1972 
Asset Size Asset Size 
(thousands of dollars) Debt/Equity (thousands of dollars) Debt/Egui ty 
~$25 19.34 $1 ,000-2 '499 .81 
$25-49 2.23 $2,500-9,999 .62 
$50-99 1.41 $10,000-24,999 .58 
$100-249 1.13 $25,000-99,999 .62 
$250-499 .91 >$100,000 .69 
$500-999 .80 
SOURCE: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury 
The ability to pass along the increased costs of production 
resulting from mandated capital expenditures is of course inhibited 
by this differential cost of obtaining capital and the need to re-
capture it over the number of units produced. In a study done for the 
Small Business Administration, Charleswater Associates found that 
small firms expressed doubt in their ability to pass-through these 
increased costs.4 As ·shat~n in Table 4, three-fifths of the small 
businesses stated that they could pass-through less than one-fourth 
of their cost increases. 
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TABLE 4 
Ability of Small Firms 
To Pass-Through Cost Increases 
Very Little 
(less than l/4) 
Some 
(1/4 to 3/4) 
Almost All 
(more than 3/4) 
Percent of Firms 
59.8% 
14.0% 
26.2% 
SOURCE: U.S. Small Business Administration 
Availability of Capital 
Small Business Administration loan programs are designed to be 
of assistance primarily to the creditworthy customer. Loan programs 
are available for capital expenditures required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy air and water pollution abatement and toxic substances regulations. 
For a myriad of reasons, not the least of which is the red tape re-
quired to obtain a loan, these programs are basically undersubscribed. 
For example, during the first five years of the SBA ~oan proqram for 
OSHA expenditures, only 156 firms borrowed $31.3 million--.001 per-
cent of the companies OSHA inspected and approximately 1% of the 
OSHA-related investment by larger firms of $3.1 billion in 1975 
5 
alone. 
In addition, the SBA has the authority to guarantee pollution 
control bonds for an aggregation of small firms gathered together by 
an underwriter into a single bond issue. Each small business must pay 
the SBA a fee of 3~% of the total principal and interest along with an 
10 
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underwriter's fee of 2% of the face value of the bond. The application 
process is tedious and expensive--a Los Angeles metal plater had 
$15,000 out-of-pocket costs for a $100,000 issue--but the net rate is 
reportedly more favorable than a typical bank loan for the smaller firms. 
In spite of the sincere purpose of SBA loan guarantees, these 
loans are not a big factor in meeting the regulatory costs of small 
firms. The fundamental economics at issue, namely unit pricing advan-
tages for the large firm with large production Quantities and less 
than proportional regulatory costs, are not offset by these loan pro-
grams. In other words, capital expenditures mandated b.Y government 
regulation produce artificial 11 economies of scale." Table 5, following, 
offers a numerical example 'of this problem. 6 
TABLE 5 
Air Pollution Control Costs in Production Areas 
Of Dry Process Crus~ed Stone Operation 
CAPITAL 
Large Plant Small Plant 
400,000 Tons/Year 1.5 Million Tons/Year 
Wet suppression equipment 
Fabric filter equipment 
Total Capital Cost 
Annualized Capital Cost 
(12.5% of Capital) 
$36,516 
32,000 
$68,516 
$8,565 
OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE 
Electricity at 
$.04/kwh 
Maintenance 
Total 0 & M 
Total Annualized Cost 
Total Cost/Ton 
$2,075 
8,094 
$10,169 
$18,734 
4. 7 cents 
$43,416 
55,000 
$98,416 
$ 5,312 
15,690 
$12,302 
$21,002 
$33,304 
2.2 cents 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Occupation Safety and Health Adminis-
tr·ation. 
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Regulation-Induced Economies of Scale--Some Examples 
Federal regulation affects small firms in a very selective manner. 
The public and their representatives are easily aroused by 11Widespread 11 
complaints such as those caused by the nitpicking rules of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration and the sometimes petty citations of OSHA 
inspectors. There is a 11 large number, 11 11major crisis 11 emphasis involved 
that may cause the public to pay little attention to the more serious 
problems that arise for small firms due to a particular regulation im-
posed on a single industry segment. It is the accumulation of these in-
dividual episodes that constitutes the 11major 11 problem that federal reg-
ulation poses for small firms. 
Chemical Specialty Firm Survey 
We conducted a survey of chemical specialty firms to assess the 
burden placed on small firms in this highly technical field. This particular 
sector of the manufacturing industry is of special interest, moreover, 
because of the heavy burden of EPA's programs for air and water pollution, 
toxic chemical substances, and solid waste disposal, as well as OSHA 
health regulations. Truly it is a difficult regulatory environment for 
any firm, ~nd more so-fot'a small one. 
The survey was sent to nearly 450 firms--large and small--that are 
members of the Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association. The par-
ticular target group, however, was the fifty percent of these firms that 
employ less than 500 persons. One hundred thirteen firms returned 
questionnaires. Eighty-nine of these firms employ fewer than 500 people. 
Only the results from the small firms are reported in this study. 
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The Environmental Protection Agency was adjudged the agency with 
the most severe requirements sixty-two times, followed by the Food and 
Drug Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commission which were 
singled out as the number one cause of problems eight times and six times 
respectively. Table 6 shows the small firm ranking of the federal regu-
latory agencies causing the most difficult problems in order of decreas-
ing severity--the questionnaire presented fourteen choices and two blanks 
for 11 0ther 11 agencies. Table 6's ranking reflects the overall severity 
by creating a composite rank for each of the five most burdensome 
agencies--a ranking of 1 could be achieved only if all respondents 
listed the same agency as the number one problem agency. Thu~ while the 
EPA is the most difficult agency for small chemical specialty firms, 
OSHA and the Department of Transpor tation are more difficult overall than 
the CPSC or the FDA. 
TABLE 6 
Ranking of Five Federal Regulatory Agencies Having 
The Most Impact on Chemical Specialty Firms 
Agency Composite Rank* 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 1.6 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) 3.2 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 4.2 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 4.3 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 4.7 
*Composite rank is calculated as follows: 
n 
Composite rank j = L rank1 ./total. number of firms i=l J 
where, 
rank ij = { 1,2,3,4,5 if respondent i ranked agency j 
as 1st, 2nd, etc. 
6 if agency j was unranked by respondent 
SOURCE: Center for the Study of American Business. 
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Furthermore, the questionnaire respondents were asked how these 
federal agencies affected them--increased paperwork, increased oper-
ating costs or increased capital costs. Table 7 below shows that for 
these five most difficult agencies the major burden was operating costs. 
TABLE 7 
Nature of Burden on Small Chemical Specialty Firms Posed By 
Five Most Difficult Agencies 
Percent of Firms* 
Operatin·g Capital 
Agency Pap_~_rwork Expenses ExJ!>endi tures 
EPA 36.0% 53_. 5% 20.9% 
OSHA 29.9% .. 41. 6%. 35.1% 
DOT 35.0% .. 61.7% 3.3% 
CPSC 33.3% 56.9% 11.8% 
FDA 42.1% 44.7% 10.5% 
*Includes only small finms which ranked the agency in one 
of the top five categories. If more than one category of 
burden was checked, an observation was counted for each. 
SOURCE: Center for the Stuqy of American Business 
In order to determine which agencies, if any, pose a life and 
death threat to these firms, they were asked 11 Please check those 
agencies, if any, which may force a change in ownership or a closing of 
your firm based upon current or proposed regulations. 11 Fifteen percent 
of the firms that ranked the EPA in the top five felt that its regula-
tions could force a closing of the firm of unspecified duration, and 
twelve percent felt it could cause a change in ownership, while 
seventy-three percent did not check either of these responses. Since 
14 
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al.l of the firms responding are ongoing concerns, the results shown in 
Table 8 are a reflection of their perception of the future, rather 
than a decscription of the recent past. 
TABLE 8 
Regulatory Effects on Ownership of Small Chemical Specialty Firms For 
Five Federal Agencies With Most Difficult Requirements 
Percent of Firms* 
Close the Change of 
Agency Firm Owners hi~ No Res~onse 
EPA 15.1% (13) 11 . 6% ( 1 0) 73.3% ( 63) 
OSHA 6.5% ( 5) 1. 3% ( l ) 92.2% ( 71) 
DOT 0% ( 0) 0% ( 0) 100.0% ( 60) 
CPSC 9.6% ( 5) 1.9% ( 1 ) 88.5% (46) 
FDA 7.9% ( 3) 2.6% ( 1 ) 89.5% (34) 
*Percent is the number of respondents who checked "close the finn" or 
"change in ownership" divided by the number of respondents ranking 
the agency as one of the five most difficult. The raw count is in 
parenthesis. 
SOURCE: Center for the Study of American Business 
A quantitative measure of severity was sought by asking for annual 
operating costs and capital expenditures of the firms to meet the man-
dates of each agency. Table 9 sh011s these estimates for the five 
agencies with the most severe requirements. As may be seen by the fre-
quency figures in the table, a significant number of respondents did not 
supply these cost estimates due to unavailability of the data or possibly 
due to zero costs--extensive follow up would be required to determine 
true cost figures for those not providing this information. The averages 
for CPSC and FDA annual operating costs and capital expenditures are 
15 
:: .. ·· · 
especially affected by the small number of responses--few firms fall 
under the FDA jurisdiction, but those that do have significant compli-
ance costs. 
TABLE 9 
The Cost To Chemical Specialty Firms For Federal Regulatory 
Programs For The Five Most Difficult Agencies 
Average Cost Per Firm* 
Nunt>er of Annual Operating Nuni>er of Capital** 
Agenc:t_ ResQonses Costs ResQonses Ex2enditures 
EPA .·. 31 . $ 95,806 . . - - . 18 $268,056 . 
OSHA 19 29,474 18 122,222 
DOT 15 23,011 4 27 .• 500 
CPSC 15 8,489 10 5,300 
FDA 10 - 86,893 4 362,500 
*Average in either of the two cost areas is calculated only for those 
firms providing a figure. 
**Capital expenditures are averaged for each finm providing a figure and 
may cover more than a single year of expenditure. 
SOURCE: Center for the Study of American Business 
The survey results clearly demonstrate that the effects of regula-
tory activity on small business varY greatly by agency. Clearly, the 
impact of the EPA and OSHA are particularly severe ·for small chemical 
speci a 1 ty fi nns. 
Impacts on Other Industries 
One of the better documented cases of the adverse impact of federal 
regulation on a large number of small finns is furnished by the foundry 
industry. This industry is composed of approximately 4,200 foundries; 
82 percent of these fi nns employ fewer than 100 people and 75 percent 
16 
employ fewer than 50 persons. The total industry employs approximately 
375,000 workers. 7 In the late 1960s this industry began to lose small 
plants, those that specialized in small orders of less than 500 pieces 
a year, due to the combined effects of economic recession and EPA 
regulation. The castings produced by these foundries are critical 
for production of limited quantity capital equipment. The size of 
the mandated EPA emission control expenditures for many of the foundries 
exceeded the net worth of the entire operation. In the period 1968 
through 1975 there were 350 verified foundry closings. Table 10 
summarizes the results of a follow-up study conducted to determine 
the causes of these foundry closings. Thirty-four percent of the 158 
concerns responding cited EPA regulations to be partly or totally to 
blame for the closing of the firm. 8 
TABLE 10 
Causes of Foundry Closings 1968-1975 
EPA in Labor Bankrupt 
Part or or or Canso 1 i- Death of 
Year Total Skills Economics dations Principal Unknown 
1968-69 1 1 7 1 '4 22 
1970 6 3 8 4 2 52 
1971 14 1 22 5 1 74 
1972 14 9 13 3 2 28 
1973 7 1 5 2 4 
1974 11 1 5 2 9 
1975 1 1 1 3 
Total 54 16 61 18 9 192 
% of Total 
Excluding 
Unknown 34% 10% 39% 11% 6% 
SOURCE: Modern Castings Market Insight 2 1975 
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Total 
36 
75 
117 
69 
19 
28 
6 
350 
In the summer of 197g we surveyed a sister industry of the 
foundry industry--the forging industry. Using a survey nearly 
identical to the one used for the chemical specialties manufacturers, 
and with the help of the Forging Industry Association, 68 forging 
firm surveys were returned (~0% of the membership), with 58 of these 
from firms employing fewer than 500 employees. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was ranked 
the most difficult agency by 57 percent of these firms and received 
a composite rank of 1 .8. The EPA was considered most difficult by 
12 percent of the firms and had a composite rank of 3.4. The De~art­
ment of Energy was considered the most difficult by 14 percent of 
the firms, but had a composite rank of 4.4. This result implies 
that the DOE is not a major source of difficulty for the industry 
as a whole, but is considered the major problem by a significant 
segment of survey respondents. 
One of the most interesting pieces of information contained in 
Table 11 is the high percentage of small forging firms that believe 
OSHA and EPA could cause the firm to close for some period of 
time--22 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Furthermore, these 
firms attributed the source of their difficulties with OSHA and EPA 
to increased capital expenditures and increased operating costs. 
In particular, OSHA-mandated capital expenditures have exceeded 
$257,000 on average, and EPA capital requirements have required an 
average cumulative expense of nearly $328 9 000. The regulatory impact 
in this vital industry segment is truly a current problem and not a 
thing of the past. 
18 
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AGENCY 
Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 
Department of·Energy 
Council on Wage and 
Price Stability 
TABLE 11 
Federal Regulatory Agencies Causing The 
t-1os t Di ffi cult Prob 1 ems For Sma 11 Forging Firms 
Percent 
Ranking Agency 
Most Difficult 
57% 
12% 
3% 
14% 
3% 
Agency's 
Composite 
Rank a 
1 .8 
3.4 
4.1 
4.4 
4.9 
Firms Indicating 
Pos sib 1 e Owner;-
ship Changes 
Change 
Owners 
Close 
Firm 
3% (2) 22% (13) 
0% (0) 17% (10) 
2% ( 1 ) 3% ( 2) 
2% ( 1 ) 5% ( 3) 
2% ( 1 ) 2% ( 1 ) 
. Average 
Annual 
Operating 
Costs 
$ 36,500 (15) 
$ 28,900 ( 9) 
$ 10,300 (12) 
$225,000 ( 5) 
$ 2,200 ( 3) 
Average 
Capital c 
Expenditures 
$257,200 (13) 
$327,600 (14) 
$ 27 '000 ( 1 ) 
$132,400 ( 5) 
-- ( 0) 
(a) 
n 
Composite rank j = L 
i =1 
rank .. /total number of firms where, lJ (b) Percent is percent of total 68 respondents. 
rank .. = { 1 ,2,3,4,5 if respondent i ranked agency j as 
1 J 1st, 2nd, 3rd, et cetera. 
6 if agency j was unranked by respondent. 
Number inside parentheses is the frequency 
of response. 
(c) Capital expenditures are totaled over all 
years and then averaged for the number of 
firms providing cost estimates. 
SOURCE: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University. 
The impact of proposed standards for air-lead exposure levels of 
100 micrograms per cubic meter promulgated by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration was examined in a study for the Lead Industries 
Association done in 1977 by Charles River Associates. This consulting 
firm estimated that the total compliance cost for the lead industry would 
be approximately $416 million (in 1976 dollars), with annual costs of 
$112 million. The predicted result in the battery industry, which is 
made up of 143 firms, was that 
... much larger unit production costs would arise for 
smaller plants than for larger plants. Because of 
large differential costs .and the fact that battery 
prices would only rise to cover the unit costs of 
the larger firms •.• the smaller plant operators would 
be forced to absorb the differential in costs. In 
many cases the amount absorbed would eliminate 
entirely the plant's profitability and about 113 
single plant battery finms would be forced to close 
••• eliminating half of the productive capacity not 
operated by the five major battery cOIJl)anies. 9 
The final OSHA standard was even more severe, 50 microg~ms per cubic 
meter. 
Regulation-Induced Market Alterations 
In some instances federal regulation has a direct impact on the 
marketability of individual products. Once again, small firms are hit 
hardest by product bans or product standards due, in part, to their 
reliance on narrow product lines. 
For example, in an effort to encourage homeowner energy conserva-
tion, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued standards 
for single and two-family homes. The National Conc~te Masonry Associ-
ation vigorously opposed the regulations on behalf of its 800 member 
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manufacturing plants since they believed the standards discriminated 
against the masonry indus try. A 11 of these p 1 ants are 1 oca lly owned 
and employ from 30 to 50 people each. Though the association calculated 
that the energy savings produced by this standard were not cost effective 
in t~eir application to masonry--that is, the added cost of insulation 
required to meet the standard could not be regained in energy savings 
during the life of the home--the only relief suggested by HUD was the 
possibility of local exceptions to the standards.10 
In March 1977 the Farmers Home Administration issued a similar set 
of regulations covering the construction industry. A spokesman for the 
Wisconsin Concrete and Products Association stated that the FmHA require-
ments--a "U" value of .07 for walls--would "effectively put most of the 
block plants in Wisconsin out of business" since 00% of those plants not 
only service the farm market but depend on this market for 75% of their 
business. 1l 
An example of a specific product prohibition having a major impact 
on a select group of small firms is the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sian's ban on the chemical Tris as a flame retardant in children's sleepwear, 
The effect of the Tris ban on the small, family-owned independent cloth 
cutters and sewers was critical. While the commission felt it had no 
alternative but to ban the use of a carcinogen in children's sleepwear, 
the equity of placing the full economic burden on the sleepwear manu-
facturers for recalling the huge inventory of Tris-treated products 
already in the market was seriously questioned by the American ~pparel 
Manufacturers Association. A plan was worked out to distribute the econ-
omic impact across the industry that is broadly responsible for the 
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development and use of Tris in children's sleepwear. However. the textile mills 
were exempted in July of 1978 from any responsibility to buy back Tris-
treated materi"al, which was unfortunate fran the viewpoint of the smaller 
processing companies. 
In this regard, the mayor of Cohoes, New York testified before the 
Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives that the 
Tris product recall could force the closure of Swanknit Corporation, 
which employs 150 people in Cohoes and has a total payroll of nearly $1 
million. The mayor suggested that since the CPSC had first indicated 
that material treated with Tris met the flammability standards set by 
the CPSC, the federal government should purchase the inventories of 
12 treated sleepwear. President Carter subsequently vetoed legislation 
that would have provided government funds to reimburse the manufacturers 
for their estimated losses of nearly $51 million due to the Tris ban, 
Swanknit was able to survive the repurchase of its $450,000 in 
treated sleepwear due to the willingness of its two major customers to 
agree to a three year payback as well as the agreement of their local 
bank to provide a loan to carry them through this difficult period. 
Sleepwear manufacturers are now using 100% polyester material which 
meets a 11 relaxed" CPSC fla111nability standard. 13 
The 1973 mattress flammability standard promulgated by the Federal 
Trade Commission has produced a differential distributive impact in 
the mattress industry, according to a 1919 study by Dr. Peter Linneman 
of the University of Chicago.14Table 12 shows the estimated impact of 
the regulations in terms of an intra-industry redistribution of sales 
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~nd profits. The smaller companies (those with sales of less than 
$548,000) suffered losses, on the average, of annual sales of $42,000 
and net income of $5,000. 
The irony is that 90% of the mattress manufacturers have met the 
flammability standard by using a polyurethane topper pad. The poly-
urethane will extinguish a cigarette burning at 900 degrees but burns 
with the intensity of napalm at 1400 degrees and emits a variety of 
noxious gasses--carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide and cyanide. 15 
TABLE 12 
Intra-Industry Impacts of the 1973 
Mattress Flammability Standard 
Size Category 
in Tenns of Changes in 
Annual Sales Average Sales 
Finns with Sales 
$0-$548,000 $ -42,000 
Finns with Sales 
$548,000-$1,000,000 40,000 
Finns with Sales 
$1,000,000-$2,300,000 120,000 
Firms with Sales 
Over $2,300,000 1,900,000 
Changes in Average 
Pre-Tax Net Income 
$ -5,000 
-18,000 
3,000 
18,000 
SOURCE: Peter Linneman, A Case Stugy of the Impacts of Consumer Safety 
Standards: the 1973 Mattress Flamnability Standard, March 1979. 
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REGULATORY EFFECTS ON ENTRY AND INNOVATION 
The classic theory that regulation results in barriers to entry 
is applicable for one-industry type regulation such as the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Inter-
s tate Commerce Coorni ss ion. The re 1 ati onshi p of the regulated to the 
regulators in these circumstances has become so intimate that econo-
mists have postulated the .. capture theory .. to describe it. The essence 
of this theory is that the regulators deal so exclusively with industry 
leaders and their problems that they become 11 Captured 11 by them. Theories 
of 11 Cartel by design .. are offered to explain the very reason for the 
formation of a regulatory agency in the first place. Whatever view is 
taken regarding why such agencies were ever formed,or whether they regu-
late or are 11 Captured, 11 the fact remains that they do prevent entry of 
new firms into the regulated industry. 
The ICC regulation of the trucking industry is the most obvious 
case of governmentally erected barriers to entry ·of small firms--
that is, independent truckers. One recent piece of evidence showing 
that the supply side of the market is being constrained to the detriment 
of the consumer is shown in Table 13. The table shows that the rate 
charged by a household mover to transport a 7,000 pound shipment 125 
miles is significantly lower if the move is in the competitive environ-
ment of intrastate trucking in Maryland than in the ICC regulated 
environment of interstate trucking. The rate-setting practices of the 
ICC resulted in rates that were 26.6% to 67.2% higher. 16 
Of course, the ICC approval procedure presents the overt barrier 
to entry, but the covert barrier is the implicit assumption of the ICC 
that the best means of providing service to shippers is via already 
approved carriers. The Commission has taken the position that: 
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It has been consistently held that existing carriers 
should be afforded the opportunity to transport all 
the traffic which they can handle adequately, econom-
ically and efficiently in the territory they serve 
before a new service is authorized. 17 
TABLE 13 
Intrastate and Interstate Moving 
Costs for 7,000-Pound 125-Mile Shipment 
lntr~state 
Rates Interstate 
(averages) Rates 
All Movers 
From Baltimore-
September 1973 $319 $461 
March 1974 382 533 
From r·1aryland suburbs 
of Washington, D.C.-
September 1973 351 552 
March 1974 381 637 
Interstate Movers Onl~ 
From Baltimore-
September 19 73 $325 $461 
March 1974 421 533 
From Maryland suburbs 
of Washington, D.C.-
September 1973 395 552 
~1arch 1974 468 637 
SOURCE: American Enterprise Institute, 1978 
Difference 
+44.5% 
+39.5% 
+57. 3% 
+67.2% 
+41. 8% 
+26.6% 
+39. 7% 
+36. 1% 
Supporting the assertion that ICC regulations act as bal"riers 
to entry is the General Accounting Office's analysis of 217 applica-
tions for temporary authority that were among the 1200 denied in 1976 
(approximately 31 percent of all such requests). The GAO report noted 
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that protestors frequently submitted 111 form• or •boiler plate• protests 
using the same language in each case ... 18 This report concludes with 
the statement: 
ICC places a heavy burden on the applicant trucker 
and his supporting shipper(s) to show that authorized 
truckers are incapable of providing the needed ser-
vice. Meanwhile, authorized truckers are not required 
to clearly demonstrate their willingness and ability 
to meet the specific needs of the shipper(s).19 
All in all, each new regulation from each agency seems to pose a 
special problem for a small firm somewhere in the economY. One example 
of this phenomenon is furnished by the proposed regulations on radiology 
equipment promulgated by an office within the Food and Drug .Administra• 
tion known as the Bureau of Medical Devices and Diagnostic Products. 
Dr. William Tuddenham describes the likely impact of these regulations 
as follows: 
These controls effectively impede the development of 
experimental devices and equipment, even of a trivial 
sort, and by virtue of the 11 Regulations Establishing 
Good Manufacturing Practices 11 they essentially 11 frr.eze 
out 11 the sma 11 manufacturer of specialty products .zo 
Moreover, the premarket approval procedures to be promulgated . 
un.der the new _Toxic Substan~·s. Control Act of 1976 may make new product 
development extremely costly for small firms. The consulting firm of 
Foster D. Snell, Inc. prepared a study of the potential impacts of TSCA 
on the chemical industry. This report forecasts the following results 
for small firms for extensive testing of new substances: 
1) Small firms would need to triple innovation expenditures 
to maintain their present rate of new product intro-
ductions. The cost pass-through would effectively price 
the small firms out of business. 
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2) At current levels of R & D expenditures, the small firm 
new product introductions would decline 80 to 90%, which 
would also, in effect, put many of them out of business,21 
EFFECTS ON GROWTH 
As a small firm grows it must obtain capital from other than short 
term bank financing or from SBA loans in order to achieve the status of 
a 11 middle 11 sized company. The role of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as the federal protector of the investing public has led it to 
establish a myriad of rules and regulations for corporate financial 
reporting. The table below sha~s the estimated cost of flotation of 
public and private debt issues by size of the iss~e. The difference 
in the two types of issues indicates, in part, the added cost of meeting 
requirements imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and an-
cillarY accounting and legal costs associated with public offerings. It 
is clear that small firms (small issues), whether private or public, 
bear disproportionately high costs, and that SEC requirements greatly 
compound those costs, 22 
TABLE 14 
Costs of Stock Issues as a Percent 
of Proceeds by Size of Issue 
Composite for 1951, 1953, and 1955 
Publicly Privately 
Size of Issue Offered Placed 
$ 500,000 - 900,000 10.24% 2.14% 
1,000,000- 1,900,000 8.00 1.52 
2,000,000 - 4,900,000 3.33 1.12 
5,000,000 - 9,900,000 1.53 .83 
10,000,000 - 19,900,000 1.44 .63 
over 20,000,000 1.22 .44 
SOURCE: American Enterprise Institute 
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Difference 
8.10% 
6.48 
2.21 
. 70 
. 81 
.78 
The recent record of the SEC, however, tends to place that agency 
among the leaders in regulatory reform on behalf of small firms. The 
Commission has revised Regulation A, which provides a reduced paperwork 
burden, so that it covers issues up to $1,500,000 instead of the earlier 
ceiling of $500,000. In March 1979 the SEC announced that companies 
with less than $1 million in assets and fewer than 500 shareholders 
that had not previously registered securities could use an abbreviated 
form to offer as much as $5 million in stock. Furthermore, up to $1.5 
million of the offering can be from existing shareholders, thus giving 
venture capital investors a chance to cash in their investments.23 
Also in March 1979 .the SEC r~vised its rules on the resale of restricted 
securities after a three year holding period by shareholders who aren't 
affiliated with the firm. This change allows venture capital investors 
to liquidate their investments after a reasonable holding period. 24 
SEC reforms offer some of the few bright spots in the regulatory 
outlook. But this favorable news is counterbalanced by other regulatory 
programs such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
which has produced an unanticipated side effect that adversely affects 
the availability of venture capital for small firms. Pension funds 
(with their $212 billion in assets as of May 1978) have been extremely 
reluctant to invest in small firms due to the "prudent" man rule and 
its severe penalties for "imprudence ... These pension fund managers 
have therefore concentrated on the "seasoned .. issues of established 
larger companies. Recently the availability of venture capital for 
small businesses has seemed to be on the rise due to a combination of 
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the 1978 reduction in the federal capital gains tax and a Labor 
Department guideline suggesting that•pension-fund managers could invest 
in a certain number of new ventures and still live up to their fiduciary 
"b"l"t" n25 respons1 1 1 1es. 
authority, however. 
This new guideline still lacks clarity and 
Small business investment companies (SBICs) are meant to be the 
federal government's response to the small firm's need for venture 
capital. Several restraints on the SBICs make it difficult for them to 
provide true venture capital to small firms, however. Though the SBA 
will loan an SBIC up to $4 for each $1 of private capital, the SBIC must 
pay interest in excess of Treasury note rates on that debt. SBICs must 
charge high interest rates, in turn, to finance those payments to the 
SBA. All these facts imply that SBIC investment in the small firm will 
be in the fonn of interest bearing debt rathe.r. than in debentures or . .. .. 
comnon stock •. N~ small firms in par:~fcul~r c;:an rarely make high 
interest payments •26 
PAPERWORK AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ENERGY 
Many burdens of federal regulation on small firms are of a paper• 
work or reporting variety. The small firm, unlike its large firm 
counterpart, does not have a professional staff to respond to these re-
quirements. Often the owner/entrepreneur is the only individual with 
sufficient knowledge to respond to an agency's requirement for infonna-
tion. 
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An example of the difficulty encountered by small firms can be 
seen by the workings of the Toxic Substances Control Act. Although Con-
gress intended to shield small businesses from much of the paperwork 
burden, the proposed regulations define "small manufacturer or processor" 
as a single-plant manufacturer with annual sales less than $100,000 or 
with production less than 2,000 pounds annually. Under that ruling, a 
firm such as the Harwicke Chemical Company in Elgin, South Carolina, is 
classified as a big business. Harwicke has less than 75 employees and 
produces $9 - $11 million in annual sales out of a single-plant facility. 
Harwicke•s sales manager has become the regulatory expert since he is 
the only employee besides the president who even holds an advanced de-
. h . t 27 g ree 1 n c em1 s ry. 
Another example of the paperwork burden on small firms involves 
the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety of the Department of Transportation. 
This agency requires a report called the .. Drivers Daily Log" that is 
both burdensome and seemingly unproductive. During the June 1979 
truckers• strike, every major television network carried interviews with 
independent truckers who said that they cannot earn a living without per-
juring themselves on this report. An estimated 1~ million truck drivers 
must file the daily log fonms in order to account for their activities 
for every hour of every day, whether on or off duty. The carrier 
must file a copy of this fonn for each of his drivers for at least 
a year--a half billion forms in all. As a result of all this record 
keeping, about three to four hundred log violations are successfully 
prosecuted each year. 28 
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Reporting costs, like the other MOre severe burdens of federal regu-
lation, are not proportional to the size of the firm. For example, 
Figure 1 shows the differential repo~ing burden for savings and 
loan institutions as a function of asset size. A savings and loan insti-
tution with less than $10 million in assets has over 13 times the cost 
per million dollars of assets as that of a savings and loan in the 
$100- 199.9 million asset range.29 
The funding and reporting requirements of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act have also produced undesirable results for small 
business and employees of small firms. The Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (PBGC) has reported that 7,300 pension plans were terminated 
in 1976, 4,300 were terminated in 1975 and 3,092 in 1974. As a pre-
ERISA comparison, 722 plans were terminated in 1967. 
The Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Legislation and General Small 
Business of the Committee on Small Business of the House of Repre-
sentatives sent 7,185 questionnaires to firms that notified the PBGC 
of intentions to terminate pension plans during June 1976 through 
April 1977. Table 15 clearly demonstrates that it was the small firms 
that were most affected--99.7% of the terminations were for plans with 
fewer than 400 participants. Seventy-nine percent of the plan partici-
pants were members of plans with fewer than 400 participants. 30 
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TABLE 15 
Pension Plan Terminations 
June 1976 - April 1977 
By Plan Size 
Pension Plan Participants 
Plan Size 
(number of participants) 
1 to 10 
11 to 25 
26 to 50 
51 to 99 
100 to 199 
200 to 399 
400 and over 
Total 
Nunt>er of 
Plans 
1,008 
341 
157 
65 
32 
19 
5 
1,627 
Average Nunber 
of Plan 
Participants 
5 
17 
36 
69 
129 
272 
1,593 
SOURCE: House Committee ~n Small Business 
This same survey· found that 77% of the respondents indicated ERISA 
had an impact on their decision to tenminate their pension plans ranging 
from 11 Some effect11 to the ~ole reason for tenmination. Fifty-five per-
cent attributed a 11 Very g'reat effect11 or the 11 0nly reason" for tennin-
ation to ERISA. 
The respondents who indicated that ERISA had some effect on their 
decision to cancel their pension plans were asked to indicate to what 
extent increased costs due to ERISA were responsible for their decisions. 
Eighty-seven percent of this group indicated that increased costs 
due to ERISA had an effect ranging from "some effect" to the sole 
cause.31 Average administrative costs per plan were estimated to 
be more than $2,300 higher after ERISA--$3,454 versus $1,102--and 
benefit costs were estimated to be, on average, $23,800 higher--
$46,630 versus $22,824. In addition, the survey respondents estimated 
ERISA-re1ated initial costs of $2,695.32 
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In an overriding sense, the adverse impact of the government's 
large paperwork burden is a qualitative matter. The very notion of 
paperwork is anathema to many small business people. The traits of 
drive and independence that cause a person to strike out as an entre-
preneur can be hostile character traits when it comes to filling out 
bureaucratic reports. It is impossible to measure the disincentive 
provided by federal regulation to this independent spirit. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The fact that federal regulation has a disproportionately adverse 
impact on small firms is borne out by the mYriad of specific industry 
examples presented in this study. The examples are representative of 
the larger whole. Regulation's effects range from life threatening, due 
to increased capital costs or market alterations, to merely burdensome, 
as in the case of paperwork requirements. 
Proponents of increased federal regulation of business activity 
occasionally make extravagant claims for the benefits of regulation for 
business itself. To be sure, if OSHA regulations would produce fewer 
workplace accidents, firms ~nd thei.r employees would both benefi.t, In 
addition, some finms have surely found new or expanded markets for 
safety consulting services and pollution control equipment as a result 
of regulation. Very little documentation of these benefits to small 
firms exists, however. 
The survey that we conducted of the small chemical specialty firms 
contained one question intended to determine what benefits these firms 
have experienced due to regulation. Of the total small firm respondents, 
9% indicated that new markets had opened up as a result; 13% cited 
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improved product quality as a benefit; 6% had installed better produc-
tion processes as a result; and 72% stated that no positive benefits 
have accrued to the finn as a result of regulation. 
The federal government's response to the difficulties caused by regu-
lation has consisted primarily of three basic approaches: (1) to generate 
government guaranteed or government financed loan programs for small 
firms, (2) to establish small business offices within the regulatory 
agencies, and (3) to hold hearings on specific industry and agency 
problems. The first approach has limited effectiveness, as mentioned 
earlier, since the ability of the small firm to repay such loans and 
to pass along increased costs to consumers is much less than its large 
firm competition. The second approach can have a minor impact, if the 
agency administrator is sympathetic to the problems of small business; 
but it merely provides window dressing if the administrator is unsympa-
thetic. 
While hearings do demonstrate Congressional concern with the regu-
latory burden on small business, they merely add to the frustrations of 
entrepreneurs who invest their time testifying if they do not, in turn, 
result in legislation that deals with the causes of these problems. 
The special legislation passed to relieve the financial burden of the 
makers of Tris-treated sleepwear was unusual. Unfortunately, as a 
result of the President's veto, no relief from the financial hardships 
imposed by the Tris ban was given to the small cloth cutters and sewers 
involved. 
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A variety of regulatory reforms has been suggested, including: 
exemption from minor but bothersome paperwork requirements, two-tiered 
regulations for small and large firms, small business impact statements, 
and even the total exemption of small firms from regulation. 33 The 
latter suggestion is not really viable in many situations. Surely small 
firms should participate in efforts to improve workplace safety or to 
improve the air and water quality of the communities in which they do 
business. In fact, some of the concerns that give rise to regulation are 
especially noticeable in small business. 
In August 1979, House-Senate conferees voted unanimously to reduce 
the record-keeping and inspection burden imposed by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration on many of the smallest firms. Employers 
of ten or fewer persons conducting business in low-injury-rate industries 
would be exempt from these requirements under a rider attached to a Labor 
Department appropriations bill for the fiscal year 1980.34 This specific 
reform measure is an example of the congressional action that can result 
when a regulatory agency is unresponsive to the need for reform. 
In contrast, the simplest reform measure would be for the regu~ 
latory agencies to carefully weigh the effects of their activities on 
business in general and small business in particular prior to final rule 
setting. This procedure would require a change in outlook on the part of 
regulators from the current attitude that small business is an unfortunate 
but necessary casualty of their missions to serve "the public interest,u 
Unfortunately, all these exhortations and calls to regulators to 
change their ways will not produce any results without a variety of sub-
stantive legislative actions aimed at regulatory reform. The survey of 
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the small chemical specialty firms presented a wide variety of suggested 
reforms which the respondents ranked according to their views of the 
effectiveness of the measures. Though they were given the opportunity 
to choose proposals extremely favorable to small business, such as exempt-
ing all small business from regulation or from government paperwork, only 
three percent ranked these self-serving responses as the most desirable 
regulatory reform measure. 
The degree of preference of these small firms for legislative 
refonn is demonstrated in Table 16. Legislative 11 Sunset 11 provisions for 
TABLE 16 
Reform Measures Favored 
By Small Chemical Specialty Firms 
Measure 
Sunset legislation 
Legislative requirement for regulatory 
benefits in excess of cost 
Legislative veto for all new regulations 
Two-tiered regulation 
Establish small business offices 
within regulatory agencies 
Require SBA Office of Advocacy•s 
review of proposed regulations 
Exempt small business from regulatory 
paperwork 
Other 
Remove all forms of federal regulation 
Exempt small business from all 
regulations 
*Composite score is calculated as follows: 
n 
Composite 
Score* 
2.4 
2.5 
3.1 
3.4 
3.6 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
3.9 
% Finns "Ranking 
Proposal First 
27% 
35% 
17% 
7% 
5% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Composite score: = .E rankiJ" /total number of respondents 
1=1 
where, 
rank .. 1J ~ 1, 2, 3 if respondent i ranked measure j = 2nd or 3rd 4 if measure j was unranked by respondent 
SOURCE: Center for the Study of American Business 
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1st, 
federal regulatory agencies and cost/benefit reform with legislative 
11 teeth 11 were favored, with the legislative veto approach and two-tiered 
regulations also favorably ranked. Less formal reform measures were 
not considered to be effective, as can be seen from the rankings of the 
proposals for establishing small business offices within regulatory 
agencies and for strengthening the role of the SBA•s Office of Advocacy. 
It is clear that the variety of regulation calls for variety of 
reforms. In some instances, information rather than standards are 
needed as in product safety. In other areas, reorientation is required 
toward goals rather than requirements such as those for workplace 
safety. Virtually all regulatory programs would benefit from a more 
reasonable approach to weighing their costs and benefits and to setting 
priorities among regulatory programs so as to maximize the benefits de-
rived. Some programs should be reviewed and revised by Congress to remove 
their impossible zero risk requirements, such as those required in the 
Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
In short, the issue of reforming government regulation is not 
merely a technical matter. In large measure, the vitality of the small 
business sector of the American economY is at stake. 
38 
FOOTNOTES 
1. NFIB Fact Book on Small Business (Washington, D.C., National Federa-
tion of Independent Business, February 1979), p. 50-57. 
2. J. McKevitt, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States Sena~e (Washington, D.C., October 7, 1977), p. 59. 
3. This example, though purely hypothetical, was constructed using 
rates of interest that are realistic for the January 1980 time frame. 
The bank loan alternative is conservative in that a typical small 
firm might well be required to pay a percent and a half over the prime 
rate of 15% used and could well be required to accept a shorter 
term than 10 years. Further complexities of requirements for compen-
sating balances, etc., have been omitted from this example. 
4. The Impact on Small Business Concerns of Government Regulations That 
Force Technological Change, Small Business Administration, prepared 
by Charleswater Associates (Boston, Massachusetts, September 1975), 
p. 135. 
5. Occu ational Safet and Health Administration•s Im act on Small Busi-
ness, U. S. Department of Labor Washington, D.C., July 1976 , p. 19. 
6. Ibid., Table B-1. 
7. R. Walk, 11 Foundries: An Industry in Crisis? 11 Modern Castings Market 
Insight, publication No. 734, 1975, p. 1. 
8. R. Walk, 11 Analysis of Shipment Trends and Foundry Closings in the U.S., .. 
Modern Castings Market Insight, publication No. 739 (March 31, 1975), 
Exhibit IV, p. l. 
9~ Economic lm act of Pro osed OSHA Lead Standards, Charles River 
Associates, Inc. Cambridge, Massac usetts,·March 1977), p. 15. 
10. D. Van Ess, Testimony Before the Select Committee on Small Business of 
the United States Senate (Madison, Wisconsin, June 1, 1977), p. 87-89. 
11. R. Walter, Effect of Government Regulation Upon Homebuilding and Re-
lated Construction, Testimony Before the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the United States Senate (Madison, Wisconsin, June 1, 1977), 
p. 98. 
12. Summar of Activities of the Committee on Small Business of the 
House of Representat1ves Was 1ngton, DC, January 9 , p. 134. 
13. Telephone conversation with Mr. Williams, Vice President of Swanknit, 
July 1979. 
-39-
14. 
15. J. Fisher, .. Price of Mattress 'Safety• Paid in Lives, Dollars, .. 
The Kansas City Times, May 31, 1979. 
16. D. Breen, .. Regulation and Household Moving Costs, .. Regulation 
(September/October 1978), p. 53. . 
17. T. Moore, 11 The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, .. Jouma 1 of 
Law and Economics ,Vol. 21 (October 1978), p. 328. 
18. New Interstate Truckers Should be Granted Temporary Operating Authority 
More Readily, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the 
United States, CED-78-32 (February 24, 1978), p. 15. The ICC has 
sought to modify the circumstances under which carriers can oppose 
licensing applications since 1978. However, no estimates of the 
effect of these changes is presently available to our knowledge. 
19. Ibid., p. 24. 
20. W. Tuddenham, M.D., .. Quality Assurance in Diagnostic Radiology: An 
irreverent View of a Sacred Cow, .. Radi.o1ogy, Vol. 131 (June 1979), 
p. 586. 
21. 
22. 
rican 
23. "SEC Changes a Registration Procedure to He 1 p Sma 11 Concerns in 
Raising Cash, .. The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1979, p. 22. 
24. "SEC Relaxes Its Restraints Significantly on Scale of Some Unregis-
tered Securities, .. The Wall Street Jour..nal, March 2, 1979, p. 101. 
25. D. Pauly with P. Abraham, 11 Venture Capital Comes Back, .. Newsweek, 
June 4 , 19 79 , p. 6 7. 
26. Summar of Activities of the Committee on Small Business of the 
House of Representat1ves Wash1ngton, DC, anuary 2, 979 , p. 48. 
27. J. Meagher, .. Another Man • s Poi son, 11 Barron • s, Septenber 5, 1977, p. 12. 
40 
28. J. McKevitt, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure (October 7, 1977), p. 63. 
29. "Industry Reporting Requirements--Benefit or Burden? .. Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board Journal, March 1977, p. 9. 
30. ERISA's Impact on Small Business, Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC 
Authority and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives (Washington, DC, 
October 11 and 14, 1977), p. 2. 
31. Ibid., p. 4. 
32 . I b i d . , p . 5 . 
33. See "H.R. 7739 and H.R. 10632, Small Business Impact Bill," Hearings 
Before Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems, Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives {1978); "The Regulatory 
Flexibility Act--S.l974," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure of the Committees on the Judiciary of 
the United States Senate (1977); and "S.l726, Small Business Economic 
Policy and Advocacy Reorganization Act of 1977," Joint Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Government Regulation and Small Business Advocacy 
of the Select Committee on Small Business and the Subcommittee on 
Economic Growth and Stabilization of the Joint Economic Committee of 
the United States Senate {1977). 
34. "Curb on Safety Inspections at Small Firms by OSHA Receives Conferee's 
Approval," The Wall Street Journal, July 31,1979, p. 10. 
41 
REFERENCES 
Benston, G. 11The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting 
Disclosure Requirements... Econortlic ·Policy and the 
Regulation of Corporate Securities, ed. Henry G. Manne. Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969~ 
Blair, R. andY. Peles. The Advantage of Size in the Ca~ital Market: 
Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications. St.ouis: Wash-
ington University Center for the Study of American Business, 
December 1977. 
Breen, D ... Regulation and Household Moving Costs ... Regulation, 
September/October 1978. 
Chilton, K. The Impact of Federal Regulation on Small Business. 
St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American 
Business, 1978. 
Cotton Dust Inflationary Impact Statement. U.S. Department of Labor, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Vol. 1. Wash-
ington, D.C., October 1976. 
Economic Impact of Proposed OSHA Lead Standards. Charles River Associates, 
Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ma~Ch 1977. 
Environmental Protection Agency Regulation ·rmeact on the Metal Finishing 
Industry. Hearings before the Subcomm1ttee on Energy, Environment, 
Safety and Research of the Committee on Small Business of the House 
of Representatives. Washington, D.C., September 19 and 20, 1978. 
ERISA•s Impact on Small Business. Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority 
and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., 
October 11 and 14, 1977. 
The Impact on Small Business Concerns of Government Regulations That Force 
Technological Chan~e. Small Business Administration, prepared by 
Charleswater Assoc ates. Boston, Massachusetts, September 1975. 
11 Industry Reporting Requirements -- Benefit or Burden?" Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board Journal, March 1977. 
Lenniman, P. A Case Study of the Impacts of Consumer Safety Standards: The 
1973 Mattress Flammability Standard. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Center for the Study of EconomY and State, March 1979. 
McKevitt, J. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice 
and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate. Washington, D.C., October 7, 1977. 
Moore, T ... The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation ... Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 21, October 1978. 
42 
New Interstate Truckers Should Be Granted TemEorary Operating Authority 
More Readily. Report to the Congress y the Comptroller General 
of the United States, CED-78-32, February 24, 1978. 
NFIB Fact Book on Small Business. Washington, D.C., February 1979. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Impact on Small Business. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., July 1976. 
Snell, Foster D., Inc. Study of the Potential Economic Impacts of the 
ProTosed Toxic Substances Control Act as Illustrated by Senate 
Bil S. 776. Florham Park, New Jersey, June 26, 1975. 
Summary of Activities of the Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives. Washington, D.C., January 2, 1979. 
Tuddenham, W., M.D. "Quality Assurance in Diagnostic Radiology: flll 
Irreverent View of a Sacred Cow." Radiology, Vol. 131, June 1979. 
Walk, R. "Foundries: An Industry in Crisis?" Modem Castings Market 
Insight, publication no. 734, 1975. 
Walk, R. "Analysis of ShipnEnt Trends and Foundry Closings in the U.S." 
Modern Castings Market Insight, publication no. 739, 1975. 
Wallace, M. and R. Penoyer. Directory of Federal Refiulatory Agencies. 
St. Louis: Washington University Center fort e Study of American 
Business, September 1978. 
Walter, R. Effect of Government Regulation Upon Homebuilding and 
Related Construction. Testimony Before the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the United States Senate. Madison, Wisconsin, 
June 1, 1977. 
Weidenbaum, M. Businessf Government and the Public. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Ha 1, 1977. 
Weidenbaum, M. The Costs of Government Regulation. St. Louis: Washing-
ton University Center for the Study of American Business, February 
1977. 
Weidenbaum, M. The Impacts of Government ~ulation. St. Louis: Washington 
University Center for the Study of rican Business, July 1978. 
Weidenbaum, M. The Future of Business Regulation. New York: AMACOM, 1979. 
43 
